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Abstract 
This paper examines year-on-year changes to the composition of performance peer 
groups used for Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in setting CEO pay in FTSE 
100 companies and finds evidence of peer selection bias. We find that firms keep their 
peer groups weak by excluding relatively stronger performing peers. We also show that 
peer selection bias is less pronounced in firms with higher institutional investor 
ownership, which suggests that institutional investors might be aware of the risks of 
peer selection bias. The results suggest that peer group modifications can be viewed, at 
least in part, as an expression of managerial rent-seeking. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Stock-Based Compensation (SBC) has become an increasingly significant component of 
executive reward for UK CEOs while the level of detail and complexity in the design of the 
stock-based element of pay has increased considerably since the mid-1980s (e.g. Buck, 
Bruce, Main, and Udueni, 2003; Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000; Goergen and Renneboog, 
2011; Main, Bruce, and Buck, 1996; Ozkan, 2011; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). Recent 
empirical research documents widespread use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in 
stock-based incentive contracts where CEOs and managers are evaluated on the basis of peer 
performance and, in particular, the use of performance peer groups in restricted share 
schemes, performance share plans, or long-term incentive plans (Carter, Ittner and Zechman 
2009; Gong, Li, and Shin 2011). Empirical studies also document that stock-based RPE is 
characterised by multiple discretionary elements and find considerable variations in specific 
RPE characteristics and in their overall complexity across firms (Carter et al, 2009).  
 
Agency theory (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979, 1982; Murphy, 1999) views performance-based pay in 
general and SBC in particular as a key governance mechanism that helps foster incentive 
alignment between the interests of executives and shareholders. Assuming that the 
shareholders have complete control over the process of pay design, the potential efficiency 
gains from using RPE in incentive contracts are well understood. Holmstrom (1979) shows 
that the efficiency of performance-based pay as an incentive alignment mechanism crucially 
depends on the amount of useful information that performance measures, such as the firm’s 
stock price, conveys about CEO actions and about the quality of CEO decisions. Agency 
theory advocates the use of stock-based RPE on the grounds that it helps “de-noise” CEO 
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effort, insulates risk-averse CEOs from non-firm-specific risks common to the firm’s peers, 
and makes SBC more efficient (Holmstrom, 1982; Murphy, 1999).  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that firms vary in their ability to maintain complete control over 
the pay-setting process and that CEO pay outcomes are determined in part by the quality of 
corporate governance at the firm (e.g. Armstrong, Ittner and Larcker 2012, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2001, Garvey and Milbourn 2006). While RPE schemes may reduce pay 
windfalls (pay unrelated to performance) and may foster strong pay-performance links under 
arm’s-length contracting, the relative efficiency of complex RPE schemes in creating and 
maintaining strong pay-performance links is less clear in those firms where key elements of 
RPE design, such as peer group composition, are influenced by powerful entrenched CEOs. 
The risk is that the quality of information that the peer group, preferred by the CEO, may 
convey about the true value of CEO actions to the firm could be compromised. If peer 
selection is compromised and peer groups are chosen strategically, CEO pay windfalls could 
be higher and value creating incentives could be lower under opaque RPE schemes than 
under more transparent fixed-pay arrangements.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the potential sensitivity of stock-based 
RPE schemes to opportunistic behaviour and rent-extraction by UK CEOs. This focus is close 
to that of the managerial power perspective on pay (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
that argues that complex and opaque incentive schemes in particular are vulnerable to 
obfuscation by entrenched managers. As such, rather than being a part of the solution, the 
preference towards RPE schemes in weakly governed firms could itself be the manifestation 
of the problem of asymmetric information and ‘hidden action’ that incentive schemes are 
expected to solve. Whilst the managerial power perspective relaxes the assumption of arm’s 
4 
 
length contracting over CEO pay, it is, nevertheless, a part of the broad agency view that 
suggests that powerful CEOs with privileged information may seek to abuse their power at 
the expense of shareholders.  
 
This paper provides the first detailed examination of year-on-year changes to the composition 
of performance peer groups in large UK firms and reports a significant bias in the peer 
selection process. First, using data on FTSE 100 firms from 2005-2011, we show that a 
significant minority of large UK firms keep their peer groups weak by excluding relatively 
stronger performing firms, where (stock price) performance is measured relative to the rest of 
the peer group. Second, we show that peer selection bias is less pronounced in firms with 
higher institutional investor ownership, which suggests that institutional investors might be 
aware of the risks of peer selection bias. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical perspectives on the role 
of RPE in CEO pay as, alternatively, underpinning or undermining corporate governance, and 
explains the institutional/regulatory landscape in the UK in relation to remuneration design 
and disclosure. Section 3 develops specific testable hypotheses regarding the impact of 
deliberate modifications of the composition of peer groups. Section 4 describes the data 
collection process. Section 5 details the results of the analysis and Section 6 interprets the 
significance of the results and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2 LITERATURE AND CONTEXT  
2.1 Literature 
A central component of the rent-extraction theory of CEO pay (Bebchuk and Fried 2003,  
2005) is the notion of ‘pay camouflage’ - where powerful CEOs and weak boards disguise 
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the total cost of the pay package by making pay schemes more complex and opaque, in part 
to manage the risk of potentially damaging public ‘outrage’. Stock-based RPE components 
such as performance share plans and long-term incentive plans are among the most complex 
elements of CEO pay (Carter et al, 2009). The composition of bespoke performance peer 
groups is, in turn, one of the least standardized elements of incentive plan design. As such, 
where boards display ‘pay camouflage’ tendencies, they may consider deliberate 
modifications to performance peer groups as a potentially attractive vehicle for rent-
extraction. 
 
In an early study, using a cross-section of US-based companies, Lewellen, Park, and Ro 
(1996) found evidence that management overstated their firms’ relative performance by 
choosing industry and peer-company comparative performance benchmarks, and broader 
market indices, that are negatively biased. Whilst the performance benchmarks studied by 
Lewellen et al were used for disclosure purposes and did not directly affect the levels of top 
executive pay, in this study, by contrast, we explore relative performance bias in performance 
peer groups that are used for incentive-based pay, with a potential first order effect on pay in 
UK firms. This focus is closer to that of Camara (2001) who compares relative with absolute 
performance-based vesting hurdles, identifying a correlation between the former and 
increased risk and dividend payments.  
 
The scope for abuse of peer selection bias is, arguably, greater in “bespoke” peer group plans, 
where group members are hand-picked by the firm, rather than in broader and more objective 
“index-based” peer group plans. Carter et al (2009) analyse a cross-section of FTSE 350 
firms in 2002 and find that firms that use, alternatively, bespoke and index-based peer groups 
display statistically similar levels of peer-group-adjusted returns. Ferri (2009) notes that the 
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cross-sectional tests employed in Carter et al’s study result in high standard errors of the 
estimates that are likely caused by large between-firm variation. Ferri (2009) further 
recommends a panel data analysis or analysis of year-on-year changes in peer group 
composition as a means of offering lower standard errors and providing more powerful 
statistical insights, which is the methodology that we employ in this paper. Gong, Li, and 
Shin (2011) analyse performance peer group data disclosed by S&P 1500 firms immediately 
after the SEC introduced new disclosure rules in 2006. Gong et al report evidence that US 
firms select peers that better capture common risks in accordance with agency theory and the 
optimal contracting hypothesis. They also find evidence of peer selection bias: using 
analysts’ forecasted annual stock returns, they show that firms with lower expected industry-
adjusted stock returns are more likely to be included as peers. Gong et al do not investigate 
the extent to which the strength of peer selection bias varies across firms that are governed 
relatively strongly or weakly. Furthermore, the extent to which US boards have continued 
abusing apparent selection bias after 2006, or, have alternatively ended this practice under 
increased public scrutiny, enabled by better disclosure, remains underexplored. By way of 
comparison, we focus here on large FTSE 100 firms that have been required to publicly 
disclose the composition of performance peer groups since the introduction of the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations in 2002 (Carter et al 2009). As FTSE 100 firms are 
particularly closely followed by analysts and investors, our sample selection if anything, 
mitigates against self-serving peer selection. 
 
Our research embodies a number of distinctive features. First, we study actual subsequent 
stock price performance of peer group members, not analyst forecasts at the award date, as 
employed in Gong et al, (2011). This could be important if the boards of directors benefit 
from privileged  information at the specific point when peer group decisions are made (see 
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Ravina and Sapienza, 2010), or, equally, where decisions are made with the benefit of 
hindsight. Second, we use relative performance tests of selection bias where excluded/added 
peers’ performance is compared to the rest of the peer group, rather than the industry average 
as in prior research. While industry-average performance benchmarks are relevant, our 
methodology is relatively more robust to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in RPE 
design across the firms. Third, we investigate the extent to which peer selection bias varies 
across firms that are governed relatively strongly or weakly.  
 
This paper also contributes to a wider literature on a range of practices by which executives 
may manipulate pay structures and outcomes. As well as option backdating (see, for example, 
Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010) these include the opportunistic (retroactive) timing of 
executive stock option grants, option repricing (downward adjustment of the strike price of 
‘under water’ options), withholding of sensitive information, and ‘golden parachutes’. In this 
context, richer understanding of the role of performance peer groups and their deliberate 
modification, on CEO pay, represents an important contribution at a time when CEO pay 
remains under intense scrutiny by shareholders and regulators.  
 
2.2 Institutional Context 
In the UK context, reward based on relative performance was endorsed by the Greenbury 
Committee (1995). This reflected contemporary concern that, especially in buoyant equity 
markets, pay arrangements which featured a significant component of “naked”, rather than 
peer-adjusted, stock-based compensation tended to deliver excessive and unwarranted levels 
of individual reward. The Greenbury Committee’s endorsement was instrumental in the 
increasing complexity of pay arrangements, as well as in the subsequent popularity of Long 
Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs). LTIPs involve the award of shares, cash or a combination of 
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the two, based on comparative performance over (usually) a three year period. Awards are 
invariably based on increased performance as measured by a combination of Total 
Shareholder Return (TSR) in real terms and/or relative to an index or performance peer group 
and an accounting based measure or measures (generally Earnings Per Share (EPS) growth). 
Our analysis of Directors’ Remuneration Reports suggests that, whilst awards require parallel 
achievement of the market-based and accounting-based performance thresholds, accounting-
based measures, with rare exceptions, are not subject to comparison with a performance peer 
group and typically require a specified rate of real increase in value (e.g. RPI + 2% for EPS 
growth targets). For instance, all 42 FTSE 100 boards that were identified as using bespoke 
peer groups in 2011 were using peers’ TSR to help ascertain the proportion of vested 
performance shares. In comparison, in only two firms from this list, BP and Royal Dutch 
Shell, the proportion of vested performance shares was also linked to the reporting firm’s 
rank against peers on other measures that were used alongside TSR – the reserves 
replacement ratio (BP), and hydrocarbon production, net cash from operating activities, and 
EPS growth (Royal Dutch Shell). This justifies our focus on peers’ TSR performance in 
particular.  
 
While the proportion of vested RPE shares depends on the reporting firm’s relative rank, 
median peer performance and closely related measures, such as mean peer performance, are 
often used by the firms in our sample as minimum performance thresholds. In 31 of the 42 
firms that were using bespoke peer groups in 2011, none of the performance shares vested 
unless the reporting firm’s TSR was at the median of the peer group. In nine firms, the 
performance shares did not vest unless the reporting firm’s TSR was equal to that of the 
index composed from peer group constituents. In two firms, Vodafone and Sage Group, the 
minimum vesting thresholds were linked to accounting performance measures that did not 
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take into account peer performance. The level of vesting was then determined by using a 
“multiplier” that scaled with the firms’ relative TSR performance. In Sage Group, the 
multiplier was equal to 0.75 for below median and was equal to 1 for median performance. In 
Vodafone, as the 2011 AR suggests, “There will be no multiplier until TSR performance 
exceeds median.” In all cases, therefore, the median peer TSR performance represents an 
important RPE threshold. A failure to beat the median peer significantly affects the expected 
RPE payoffs. 
 
Successive versions of the UK Corporate Governance Code (`the Code’) have required a 
greater degree of transparency and disclosure in reporting pay arrangements in general. In 
relation to the period under scrutiny in this study, the Code forms one of the two sets of 
recommendations or requirements which influenced the disclosure of details of remuneration 
policy. The Code acknowledges the principle of comparing a company’s performance with its 
peers in determining levels of pay, and endorses approval of such arrangements by 
shareholders, but it is non-prescriptive in tone and merely urges that companies ‘should use 
such comparisons with caution’. Ultimately, in any case, the Code is non-binding and 
companies engage with its recommendations on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. By contrast, the 
regulations for quoted companies’ remuneration reports within the Companies Act (2006) 
carry legal force and require publication of and explanations for the choice of performance 
conditions employed, albeit in the non-audited part of the report, and without specific 
guidance as to what constitutes an acceptable level of explanation. Prior to 2013, as part of 
the overall remuneration policy, these details would be subject to a non-binding shareholder 
vote. In the absence of a binding shareholder vote and with significant discretion available to 
firms in terms of  the degree of disclosure of performance comparison arrangements, this 
aspect of pay design remained vulnerable to self-serving discretionary behaviour by 
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executives who may have been in a position to influence the remuneration committee. On the 
specific issue of influence, the Code observes, rather weakly: ‘where executive directors …..  
are involved in advising or supporting the remuneration committee, care should be taken to 
recognise and avoid conflicts of interest’.  
 
Since 2013, the requirements have tightened significantly, with companies’ remuneration 
policy requiring endorsement by shareholders in a binding vote held at least every three 
years, together with an annual advisory vote on the implementation report, which details how 
policy translates into detail within a given year. It would appear, therefore, that increased 
disclosure, coupled with the need for shareholder approval, and stronger and more 
independent non-executive directors, have the potential to constrain some of the more direct 
means by which CEOs might be able to inflate their pay and extract rents in future.  
 
3 HYPOTHESES 
To the extent that incentives to manipulate peer groups exist, how exactly could boards use 
their discretion opportunistically? Figure 1 illustrates this. Deliberate modifications of the 
composition of peer groups may include instances where weaker peers, viewed as likely to 
underperform, are added to the group. Alternatively, peers that are expected to outperform the 
group can be removed. These scenarios require a degree of insider knowledge / superior 
information on the part of the reporting firm’s directors (e.g. Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). 
Additionally, peer group modifications can be applied ex-post with the benefit of hindsight as 
reported performance periods often commence 2 to 10 months prior to the first published 
details of peer groups in annual reports. As such, boards can add/remove peers based on their 
performance in the months directly preceding the public announcement of peer group 
composition without any requirement for superior knowledge on the part of directors. Finally, 
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boards of directors may make adjustments to the peer groups after the public announcement 
of peer group composition if events such as takeovers and delistings of peer group members 
during the performance period warrant such changes. When a delisted firm is removed from 
the group entirely, group TSR is unaffected by the firm’s share price prior to delisting. So 
instead of, say, substituting the delisted peer from the last month of trading onwards with a 
synthetic TSR index equal to the average TSR of the rest of the peer group, a decision could 
be made to completely remove a delisted peer from the peer group depending on the peer’s 
performance prior to the delisting. This might result in weaker relative performance 
benchmarks and overstated relative performance. The above analysis suggests that a minority 
of opportunistic CEOs might have both the incentive and ability to use peer group 
modifications for rent-extraction. Accordingly, we propose:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Deliberate modifications to performance peer group composition exhibit, on 
average, peer selection bias whereby weaker peers are added to the peer groups and stronger 
peers are removed. 
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Figure 1. Year-on-Year Changes in Peer Group Composition 
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significant literature identifies institutional shareholders as a potent corporate governance 
mechanism that can influence CEO decisions. They have the incentive (via large ownership 
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via threats to sell their shares); see, among others, Becht et al (2010), Chung, Firth and Kim 
(2002), Ertimur et al (2011), Gillan and Starks (2007), Hartzell and Starks (2003).  
The monitoring-enhancing effects of board independence and, in particular, the effects of the 
proportion of independent (non-executive) directors and a split of the roles of Chairman and 
CEO on pay outcomes are the subject of a substantial interdisciplinary literature (e.g. Conyon 
and Peck (1998), Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998), Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1989)). Empirical evidence shows that weaker boards tend to reward CEOs for ‘lucky’ 
events outside of CEOs’ control more often than stronger boards do (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2001; Garvey and Milbourn, 2006), while board independence is often 
associated with lower levels of CEO pay (e.g. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999) and with 
stronger pay-performance links (e.g. Rayan and Wiggins, 2004; Goh and Gupta, 2010). 
Board theorists warn, however, that independent boards may suffer from information 
problems: non-executive directors, lacking the incentives and skills to monitor CEOs, may 
depend on the CEOs for key information (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). Accordingly, we 
propose: 
Hypothesis 2: The tendency for deliberate peer group modifications to result in weaker peer 
groups is more pronounced in firms characterised by less independent boards and weaker 
investor oversight. 
   
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We study the use of performance peer groups in CEO pay arrangements in FTSE 100 
companies for a seven-year period (2005-2011). The sample is formed from companies 
included in the FTSE 100 list in 2007 and the full list of companies is provided in Supporting 
Information. The hand-collected data on long-term incentive components of CEO pay, 
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including the composition of performance peer groups, are drawn from annual reports. Data 
on firm-specific corporate governance variables, ownership and financial data are sourced 
from Thomson Datastream, ThomsonONE, and annual reports. Table 1 summarizes and 
provides the definitions of all variables used in the analysis.  
 
Table 1. Variables, Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition and source 
Log (total assets) Natural log of total assets (Thomson Datastream) 
Chair is CEO or Ex-CEO  Has the chairman previously held the CEO position in the company? (Thomson 
Datastream) 
Board Independence Percentage of independent board members as reported by the company.  
(Thomson Datastream) 
Director Affiliations Average number of other corporate affiliations for the board member. 
(Thomson Datastream) 
Board Tenure Average number of years each board member has been on the board. (Thomson 
Datastream) 
Institutional investor 
ownership concentration 
The percentage ownership held by the top-five institutional investors.  
(ThomsonONE) 
Institutional investor 
ownership turnover (%) 
Average portfolio turnover by top-five institutional investors (%), weighed by 
percentage ownership. (ThomsonONE)  
TSR(PT,i) Log return on the portfolio comprised from performance peer group reported by 
firm 𝑖 in year T. TSR is measured over the relevant performance periods 
specified in annual reports, normally years T, T+1, and T+2. (Company 
Annual Reports, Thomson Datastream) 
TSR(AddedT,i) Log return on the portfolio of newly added peer group members. TSR is 
measured over the relevant performance periods specified in annual reports, 
normally years T, T+1, and T+2. (Company Annual Reports, Thomson 
Datastream) 
TSR(RemovedT,i) Log return on the portfolio of the companies that are deliberately removed from 
the peer group. TSR is measured over the relevant performance periods 
specified in annual reports, normally years T, T+1, and T+2. (Company 
Annual Reports, Thomson Datastream) 
TSR(Counterfactual PT,i) Log return on the portfolio comprised from performance peer group reported in 
year T-1, excluding those firms that are delisted by the start of performance 
period T. TSR is measured over the relevant performance periods specified in 
annual reports, normally years T, T+1, and T+2. (Company Annual Reports, 
Thomson Datastream) 
Weak peers added T,i  The number of peers added that achieve TSR performance strictly lower than 
that of the median firm in Counterfactual P. (authors’ own calculations) 
Strong peers added T,i The number of peers added that outperform the median firm in Counterfactual 
P. (authors’ own calculations)  
Weak peers removed T,i The number of peers removed that underperform the median firm in 
Counterfactual P.  (authors’ own calculations) 
Strong peers removed T,i The number of peers removed that outperform the median firm in 
Counterfactual P. (authors’ own calculations) 
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Table 2 reports that 70 to 80 percent of FTSE 100 firms use performance peer groups to help 
determine CEO pay in any given year. Both Index Peer Groups (where performance criteria 
are measured exclusively relative to broad indices such as FTSE 100, FTSE 350, FTSE World 
Media etc.) and Bespoke Peer Groups (where performance criteria are measured, at least in 
part, relative to bespoke peer groups) are widely used. The focus of our attention is on this 
second group, i.e. on identifying instances of deliberate modification of peer groups in the 
case of companies using bespoke peer groups.  
 
Table 2. Use of Compensation Peer Groups in Long-Term CEO Pay, FTSE 100 Firms 
 Firms, count 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Performance Peer Groups not Used: 
Companies without a long-term incentive 
component in CEO pay. 
7 8 7 8 9 4 5 
Peer groups are not used and peers’ 
performance is not taken into account. 
10 9 10 15 13 17 21 
Index Peer Groups: 
Performance criteria are measured 
exclusively relative to broad indices (e.g. 
FTSE 100, FTSE 350, FTSE World 
Media). 
30 29 27 27 27 26 23 
Bespoke Peer Groups: 
Performance criteria are measured, at 
least in part, relative to bespoke peer 
groups. 
45 49 53 45 44 44 42 
Total firms 92 95 97 95 93 91 91 
  
 
4.1 Dependent variables 
4.1.1 Peer Selection Bias  
First, we analyse relative TSR performance of the added/removed peers to see if relatively 
weaker/stronger peers are added/removed. Our focus on peers’ TSR performance is 
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motivated by the analysis of Directors’ Remuneration Reports and is justified in Section 2.2. 
Table 3 reports instances of deliberate modification (year-on-year changes) of the 
composition of bespoke peer groups, confirming that they are quite common. For instance, 20 
(or 45%) of the 44 companies which used bespoke peer groups in 2009 initiated changes to 
their peer groups. Of these 20 companies, 15 included new peers and 10 removed some of the 
existing peers (excluding delisting-related changes).  
 
Table 3. Instances of Deliberate Modification of the Composition of Bespoke Peer Groups 
(Year-on-Year Changes), FTSE 100 Firms 
Firms, count  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Companies which modified the 
composition of (bespoke) performance 
peer group either by including new 
peers or by removing some of the 
former peers (excluding changes 
resulting from delistings) 
  
15 19 18 20 12 12 96 
Companies which included new peers 
into the peer group 
 
13 17 11 15 10 10 76 
Companies which removed some of the 
former peers (excluding changes 
resulting from delistings) 
9 12 14 10 6 6 57 
 
Note: As some firms modify the composition of peer groups by both including new peers and by removing some 
of the old peers in the same year, the values in rows two and three do not necessarily sum to the value in row one.    
 
With reference to Figure 1 and using notation PT for the performance peer group reported in 
year T, we define the portfolio AddedT as those companies that are newly included in PT but 
which were not included in PT-1. Portfolio RemovedT is defined as those companies that were 
included in the peer group PT-1 but were then removed and so did not appear in peer group PT. 
The benchmark portfolio against which we compare portfolio AddedT is Counterfactual PT , 
defined in Figure 1 as PT-1 net of any companies that are delisted by the start of performance 
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period T. The benchmark portfolio for RemovedT is PT itself. We test for peer selection bias 
(Hypothesis 1) by testing whether the portfolio returns of RemovedT and AddedT are equal to 
the returns on the respective benchmark portfolios PT and Counterfactual PT over the 
subsequent (usually three-year) performance period pertaining to PT. By comparing TSR of 
AddedT to that of Counterfactual PT we are able to isolate and study the effect of the decision 
to add new peer group members. By comparing TSR of RemovedT to that of PT we are able to 
isolate and study the effect of the decision to remove peers.  
 
Portfolio returns are calculated using monthly returns indices resourced from Thomson 
Datastream as follows: (1) In all cases we use the relevant (in most cases, three-year) 
performance periods specified in Annual Reports. (2) All portfolios are equally-weighted. (3) 
The proceeds of delisted firms are reinvested (equally) across the remaining firms in the 
portfolio. (4) In those cases where all firms in RemovedT are delisted before the end of the 
relevant performance period (pertaining to PT) portfolio returns on RemovedT and PT are 
compared on the last month of RemovedT trading. (5) The end of the observation period is 
May 2013. (6) Monthly returns for foreign peers are calculated using equity prices 
denominated in the home currency, rather than in GBP. 
 
 
4.1.2 The Propensity to Modify the Composition of Bespoke Peer Groups 
The second step in our analysis concerns the extent to which firm-level corporate governance 
characteristics affect the boards’ propensity to add/remove weak/strong peers (Hypothesis 2). 
With the view to differentiating across specific types of peer selection bias, we define Weak 
peers added as the number of peers added that achieve TSR performance which is strictly 
lower than that of the median firm in Counterfactual P (defined in Figure 1 as the peer group 
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reported in year T-1 net of firms delisted by year T). Strong peers added is defined as the 
number of peers added that outperform the median firm in Counterfactual P. Similarly, Weak 
peers removed is the number of removed peers that underperform the median firm in 
Counterfactual P, while Strong peers removed is the number of removed peers that 
outperform the median firm. The use of the median Counterfactual peer for performance 
benchmarking is motivated by the analysis of Directors’ Remuneration Reports and is 
justified in Section 2.2. As before, TSR performance is measured over the relevant 
performance period; normally years T, T+1, and T+2. 
 
In the Amec example, discussed in Supporting Information, our calculations suggest that 
seven of the fifteen firms that were deliberately removed from the peer group in 2011 
performed weaker than the median firm in the counterfactual (old, 2010) peer group in the 
period from April 2011 (start of the performance period) to May 2013 (end of observation 
period), while eight removed firms outperformed the counterfactual median over the same 
period. In contrast, fifteen firms that were added to the peer group in 2011 performed weaker 
than the counterfactual median while not a single newly added peer managed to outperform 
the counterfactual median (TSR data, sourced through Thomson Datastream, was available 
for fifteen of the sixteen firms that were added to the peer group in 2011). Accordingly, for i 
= ‘Amec’ and t = ‘2011’, we wright Weak peers added i,t = 15, Strong peers added i,t = 0, 
Weak peers removed i,t = 7, Strong peers removed i,t = 8. As a result of these changes, the 
performance of the new, 2011, peer group approved by the board was significantly weaker 
than that of the counterfactual peer group that the board used one year earlier and that could 
have been easily “recycled”. Our estimations further suggest that if the peer group had not 
been changed, the value of performance shares that could be expected to vest to Amec’s CEO 
would be lower by an amount equivalent to 65.6% of the CEO’s annual salary. This 
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illustrates the effect that peer group selection/changes can have on a CEO’s final 
remuneration and financial incentives. All relevant details (vesting scale, the proportion of 
TSR-related vs. EPS-related performance awards) are carefully taken into account and are 
made available in Supporting Information. 
 
4.2 Independent variables  
The percentage ownership held by the top-five institutional investors (Institutional investor 
ownership concentration) is used as a proxy for institutional ownership (Hypothesis 2). 
Board independence proxies include the percentage of independent board members as 
reported by the company (Board Independence), average board tenure (Board Tenure) and 
the dummy variable Chair is CEO or Ex-CEO, taking the value 1 if the chairman serves as 
the CEO or previously held the CEO position in the company and 0 otherwise. While the vast 
majority of FTSE 100 boards split the roles of Chairman and CEO, a significant minority of 
FTSE 100 Chairmen have previously held the position of CEO at the same firm. This type of 
arrangement might both question the independence of the Chairman and suggest a degree of 
shared tolerance for the practice of deliberate peer group weakening (see Andres et al 2014; 
Evans et al 2010). 
 
4.3 Control (independent) variables  
Instances of CEO pay manipulation have been shown to co-vary with firm size in a number 
of different contexts. Heron and Lie (2009) show that option backdating is more likely to 
occur in smaller firms. Bizjak et al (2011) report that smaller firms inflate CEO pay by 
choosing relatively larger companies as compensation peers. Accordingly, we use the log of 
total assets to control for firm size. Furthermore, we use the average number of corporate 
affiliations of board members (Director Affiliations) as a proxy for board networks (Fich and 
20 
 
Shivdasani, 2006; Larcker, So, and Wang, 2013; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). Finally, we 
control for average portfolio turnover of the top-five institutional investors (Institutional 
investor ownership turnover), weighted by their percentage ownership, as a proxy for 
investor heterogeneity and heterogeneous investment horizons (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 
2005). 
 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics. Panel A summarises data for 2006-2011 across all firms 
that employ bespoke peer groups. The regression analysis of year-on-year changes in peer 
group composition leaves out year 2005. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for those firms 
that either do not employ peer groups or use index peer groups. Together, these suggest that 
firms in Panel A tend to be larger than firms in Panel B. This is in accordance with prior 
research (Carter et al, 2009). Panel A is also characterised by relatively lower institutional 
investor ownership turnover, lower board tenure, and relatively more independent boards 
with better connected (busier) directors. The t-statistics for the corresponding tests across the 
two panels are reported and are statistically significant. An average bespoke peer group 
includes close to 16 peers. This result is partially influenced by an outlier, Reed Elsevier, 
which introduced a 125-strong peer group in 2010. If we exclude Reed Elsevier, the mean 
peer group size drops to 15.6. We exclude Royal Bank of Scotland from Table 4 and from the 
rest of the analysis on account of its majority ownership by the UK government. Including 
Royal Bank of Scotland tends to marginally strengthen results on peer selection bias. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics, 2006-2011 
Panel A: Firm/years that employ Bespoke Peer Groups  
 Obs Mean St. dev. Min Max T-stat (a) 
(panels 
A vs. B) 
Log (total assets) 229 16.76 1.75 13.15 21.44 4.42** 
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Chair is CEO or Ex-CEO 229 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.99 
Board Independence 229 62.30 11.00 23.08 93.75 4.51** 
Director Affiliations 229 2.00 1.06 0.00 6.86 3.48** 
Board Tenure 229 5.11 1.64 0.91 12 2.90** 
Institutional investor ownership 
concentration 
229 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.46 1.74 
Institutional investor ownership 
turnover (%) 
229 24.48 6.75 11.61 63.24 4.23** 
Total number of peers in PT,i  229 16.11 9.77 4 125  
Weak peers added T,i 229 0.61 1.80 0 15  
Strong peers added T,I 229 0.39 1.23 0 11  
Weak peers removed T,I  229 0.30 1.04 0 7  
Strong peers removed T,I) 229 0.36 1.21 0 9  
Panel B: Firm/years that do not employ Bespoke Peer Groups  
 Obs Mean St. dev. Min Max  
Log (total assets) 252 16.10 1.51 12.43 21.22  
Chair is CEO or Ex-CEO 252 0.06 0.24 0 1  
Board Independence 252 57.67 11.46 33.33 100  
Director Affiliations 252 1.70 0.80 0.18 4.5  
Board Tenure 252 5.67 2.44 0.25 12.59  
Institutional investor ownership 
concentration 
252 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.55  
Institutional investor ownership 
turnover (%) 
252 26.90 5.76 13.71 59.06  
 
Notes:. 
a) ** - indicates significance at the 1% level; * - indicates significance at the 5% level 
 
 
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Statistical tests are organised as follows. We first test whether peer group modifications are 
characterised by self-serving peer selection (Hypothesis 1). Second, we ascertain the degree 
to which peer group modifications can be viewed as a product of managerial power and firm-
specific governance (Hypotheses 2).  
 
5.1 Peer Selection Bias 
Table 5 reports 73 year/firm instances (𝑇, 𝑖) where reporting firm 𝑖 added new peers. These 
new peers form AddedT,i. There are 55 year/firm instances where firms deliberately removed 
peers; these make up RemovedT,i. We test if portfolio returns of RemovedT,i  and AddedT,i are 
equal to returns on the benchmark portfolios PT,i and Counterfactual PT,i respectively. Table 5 
reports summary statistics for the portfolio log total shareholder returns and the 
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corresponding t-tests. The mean log return of AddedT,i peers is about 5 percentage points 
below the benchmark return, though this difference is not statistically significant against a 
two-sided alternative. The mean log return on the portfolio of removed peers is about 15.4 
percentage points higher than its benchmark return. This result is both highly significant 
statistically and economically important. Including Royal Bank of Scotland increases the 
sample size to 76 added and 57 removed and yields marginally lower p-values, strengthening 
the results. Table 5 further reports the results of the Wilcoxon matched-pairs, signed-ranks 
tests on median difference, a non-parametric test that does not assume that the difference in 
matched pairs is normally distributed. The results of the Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests closely 
confirm the results of the t-tests. Accordingly, we accept Hypothesis 1; evidence suggests 
that peer group modifications display elements of peer selection bias.  
 
Table 5. Portfolio Performance (Paired) tests 
Panel A: TSR performance(a) of newly added peers vs TSR of ‘old’ counterfactual peer group 
 Obs Mean St. dev. 
TSR(AddedT,i); log return on the portfolio of newly 
added peer group members  
 
73 -0.076 0.604 
TSR(Counterfactual PT,i); log return on the portfolio 
comprised from performance peer group reported in year 
T-1, excluding those firms that are delisted by the start of 
performance period T 
73 -0.024 0.452 
 
Difference in means 
 
73 
 
-0.052 
 
0.568 
 
T-test: H0: mean(TSR(AddedT,i)- TSR(Counterfactual PT,i))=0 
t =  -0.79 
Pr=0.43 
 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: H0: median(TSR(AddedT,i)- TSR(Counterfactual PT,i))=0 
Z = -.965 
Pr=0.335 
Panel B: TSR performance(a) of current peer group vs TSR of recently removed peers 
 Obs Mean St. dev. 
TSR(RemovedT,i); log return on the portfolio of the 
companies that are deliberately removed from the peer 
group 
55 0.068 0.507 
 55 -0.086 0.397 
23 
 
TSR(PT,i); log return on the portfolio comprised from 
performance peer group reported in year T  
 
Difference in means 
 
55 
 
0.154 
 
0.497 
 
T-test: H0: mean(TSR(RemovedT,i)- TSR(PT,i))=0 
t =  2.30 
Pr=0.026 
 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: H0: median(TSR(RemovedT,i)- TSR(PT,i))=0 
Z = 2.807 
Pr=0.005 
 
Notes:  
a) In all cases, TSR is measured over the relevant performance periods specified in annual reports, 
normally years T, T+1, and T+2 (i.e. subsequent to peer changes). 
 
5.2 The Propensity to Modify the Composition of Bespoke Peer Groups 
If peer selection bias is detected, can peer group modifications be viewed, at least in part, as 
an expression of managerial power? Table 6 reports the results of negative binomial 
regressions that analyse the count variables Weak peers added, Strong peers added, Weak 
peers removed, and Strong peers removed. The negative binomial specification is appropriate 
where the count variable is characterised by overdispersion (or extra-Poisson variation). If 
decisions to remove firms X and Y from the peer group are made on the basis of firms’ 
relative performance vis-a-vis the rest of the peer group, the two decisions are correlated. 
These correlated events can give rise to overdispersion in modification counts. Further, all 
models control for the lagged (log) peer group size, which is used as the offset with the 
coefficient constrained to one. Standard errors are clustered for 52 clusters in firms.  
 
Results in Table 6 suggest that investor oversight (Institutional Investor Ownership 
Concentration) has a differential effect on four types of modifications. While the rates with 
which firms add new peers (both weak and strong) are higher in firms with stronger investor 
oversight, higher Institutional Shareholder Ownership Concentration is negatively associated 
with instances where relatively stronger peers are removed. In contrast, Chair is CEO or Ex-
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CEO seems to be positively associated with all four types of modifications, and its effect on 
the propensity to remove stronger peers is statistically significant. The joint significance tests 
on the effects of co-variates across the four models are reported in the far-right column in 
Table 6. The effects of Board Independence are mixed and inconclusive as independent 
boards are associated both with modifications that make peer groups weaker (Weak peers 
added) and stronger (Weak peers removed). Overall, the empirical evidence lends partial 
support to Hypothesis 2. The tendency on the part of the firms to exclude relatively stronger 
performing peers, which we document empirically in the previous section, appears to be less 
pronounced in firms with high levels of Institutional Shareholder Ownership Concentration.  
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Table 6. The Propensity to Modify the Composition of Bespoke Peer Groups 
FTSE 100 firms where performance criteria are measured, at least in part, relative to bespoke peer groups. Negative binomial regressions on pooled data 2006-2011. Standard 
errors are clustered for 52 clusters in firms. Dependent variables are defined as follows. Weak peers added T,i is the number of peers added that achieve TSR performance 
strictly lower than that of the median firm in the counterfactual peer group (defined as the peer group reported in year T-1 excluding firms delisted by year T). Strong peers 
added T,i is the number of peers added that outperform the median firm in the counterfactual peer group. Weak peers removed T,i is the number of peers removed that 
underperform the median firm in the counterfactual peer group. Strong peers removed T,i is the number of peers removed that outperform the median firm in the 
counterfactual peer group. TSR performance is measured over the relevant performance period; normally years T, T+1, and T+2. 
 Outcomes  
Effect (Cluster-robust SE) 
Wald tests of joint significance 
over four models, Chi2(4) 
 Weak peers added Strong peers added Weak peers 
removed 
Strong peers 
removed 
 
Institutional Investor 
Ownership Concentration 
4.32 (3.13) 8.19** (2.79) .030 (3.59) -6.14* (2.97) 17.03** (P-value 0.002) 
Institutional Investor 
Ownership Turnover 
-.048 (.039) -.026 (.036) -.059 (.035) -.061 (.040) 3.53 (P-value 0.47) 
Board Independence .043* (.020) .021 (.020) .036 (.021) .013 (.018) 5.36 (P-value 0.25) 
Board Tenure .008 (.093) -.012 (.087) -.013 (.124) .149 (.114) 2.91 (P-value 0.57) 
Director Affiliations -.472* (.231) -.092 (.227) -.522 (.311) -.738** (.250) 12.45* (P-value 0.014) 
Chair is CEO or Ex-CEO .462 (.447) .476 (.377) .654 (.409) .965* (.389) 7.09 (P-value 0.13) 
Log Assets -.074 (.154) .082 (.099) -.125 (.159) -.345** (.121) 16.04** (P-value 0.003) 
Constant -3.87 (4.31) -7.40 (3.65) -1.92 (4.60) 4.20 (3.33)  
Log peer group size (T-1) 
(offset) 
1  1  1  1   
Ln(alpha) 1.55** (.218) 1.66** (.214) 1.88** (.284) 1.77** (.305)  
Number of obs 229  229  229  229   
Number of clusters 52  52  52  52   
 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; ** - indicates significance at the 1% level; * - Indicates significance at the 5% level 
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As far as control variables are concerned, boards with more Director Affiliations (a proxy for 
board networks and for ‘busy boards’) are found to be negatively associated with all four 
types of peer group modifications. The joint effect of Director Affiliations in the four 
regressions, Table 6, is statistically significant (p<0.05) which suggests that busy boards 
generally implement fewer changes. Finally, the proxy for firm size (Log Assets) is 
negatively associated with modifications that remove peers and its effect on the propensity to 
remove stronger peers is statistically significant. While examining board governance, we also 
analysed the effect of compensation (remuneration) committee independence (e.g. 
Faulkender and Yang, 2010), i.e. the percentage of independent board members on the 
compensation committee as reported by the company. The effect of compensation committee 
independence was not statistically significant. 
 
To ensure that our results are not driven by heterogeneity in capabilities and incentives across 
institutional monitors (Almazan, Hartzel and Starks 2005), we followed Shin and Seo (2011) 
and classified the top-five institutional owners into five categories - Banks, Insurance 
Companies, Pension Funds, Endowments and Foundations, and Mutual Funds using the 
investor classification available in ThomsonONE. This reveals that most top-five institutional 
owners in our data are mutual funds and the correlation coefficient between Institutional 
investor ownership concentration and share ownership held by mutual funds is 0.98. The 
regression results and statistical inference are robust to the use of share ownership held by 
mutual funds as an alternative proxy for ownership concentration.  
 
5.3 Discussion 
This study reports evidence that peer group adjustments are used by (some) CEOs to extract 
rents from their organisations. The empirically rather weak effects of board independence in 
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rent extraction regressions in Table 6 raise interesting questions. In seeking to understand 
these results, it is important to be clear that this study does not control for multiple alternative 
ways of rent extraction that could be potentially open to abuse in weak boards. The lack of 
evidence on the moderating effect of board independence on rent extraction via a particular 
medium does not imply increased rent extraction in aggregate, and may in fact be consistent 
with lower aggregate extraction, where there is substitution between different forms of rent 
capture. To develop this line of reasoning, it may be the case that with relatively weak, 
compliant boards, CEOs are able to extract rent from the organisation without having to 
resort to practices such as peer group adjustment, which requires investment of time and 
careful judgement and which cannot, in any case, be guaranteed to deliver the intended 
outcomes. So, for example, to the extent that CEOs with weak boards are able to extract rent 
more straightforwardly via increased salaries or annual bonuses, one might expect that 
practices such as the addition of weak peers to performance groups would be confined to 
cases where board vigilance was robust in relation to the more obvious rent extraction 
measures.  
 
Second, the analysis of year-on-year changes to the composition of bespoke peer groups in 
this study does not examine the (dynamic) self-selection of firms into those that use bespoke 
peer groups for benchmarking and those that use “index only” peer groups. This is mostly 
due to the data restrictions. There are ten firm-year cases in the data where firms stopped 
using index peer groups and started using bespoke peer groups (there are six cases where 
firms started using index peer groups in lieu of bespoke peer groups), which would not 
constitute a sample large enough for a formal statistical investigation.  
 
 
28 
 
6 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The results suggest that peer group modifications can be viewed, at least in part, as an 
expression of managerial power, rather than of the desire for more robust corporate 
governance. This research adds weight to those studies which suggest that an important factor 
in the detailed design of pay arrangements for senior executives is the ability of the package 
to deliver significant gains to the eligible executive(s). In practical terms, these results 
suggest the need for stronger justification by remuneration committees and greater vigilance 
on the part of boards and shareholders in relation to changes in peer group composition. It is, 
of course, the case that the anatomy of contemporary executive pay arrangements is far more 
complex than at any time in the past. This reflects a response to a regulatory steer towards 
more individual, bespoke forms of reward and in part, perhaps, a deliberate desire to 
obfuscate pay structures in order to frustrate scrutiny. Either way, increased complexity has 
meant that the responsibility of shareholders to monitor and moderate the detailed design of 
pay arrangements has become significantly more onerous. Our results suggest a need for 
more stringent regulation regarding the composition of peer groups, and subsequent 
modifications to peer group membership. Boards should consider carefully whether broader, 
non-bespoke comparator groups might be preferable in underpinning good governance, 
compared with the identified governance-diluting effect of changes in bespoke group 
composition.  
 
Addressing such effects via modification of governance principles and codes is, of course, 
not straightforward, and companies are likely to view any such moves as an unwelcome and 
unwarranted intrusion into corporate affairs. It is, however, difficult to argue against the need 
for greater uniformity and transparency in disclosure requirements relating to all aspects of 
peer group use.  
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Further avenues for investigation could include the analysis of the narratives used by 
companies in validating peer groups and, in the absence of prescriptive reporting 
requirements, the probing of differences between companies with more and less liberal 
approaches to detailed disclosure of remuneration arrangements. Similarly, the comparison of 
peer group changes which are a function of deliberate action or, alternatively, a ‘natural’ 
occurrence would enrich our understanding of the degree of self-serving manipulation. 
  
In conclusion, we contend that this study contributes to a richer understanding of the design 
and impact of alternative remuneration arrangements. The contribution lies principally in the 
empirical evidence on the self-serving adjustment of performance peer groups by executives, 
and lends force to the managerial power perspective on board governance at the expense of 
the arm’s-length contracting view favoured by agency theorists. 
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Supporting Information 
Two cases of peer group modifications: Amec Plc and Barclays Plc. 
Amec Plc: Amec Plc. states in its 2010 annual report (p.52):  
“The composition of the comparator group, which is reviewed at the time of each set of 
awards, has up to 2010 comprised only UK-listed companies in relevant FTSE 
subsectors. For 2011, the group has been amended to include a number of non-UK 
listed companies who are direct business competitors of AMEC and to exclude UK 
companies where there is little or no overlap in activities…”.  
Overall, fifteen firms were deliberately removed (three firms were dropped due to delisting), 
and sixteen firms were added, to the peer group. The new, 2011, peer group comprised 27 
firms (excluding Amec). TSR data, sourced through Thomson Datastream, was available for 
25 peers and showed, on average, virtually zero (0.7%) log total shareholder return in the 
period from April 2011 (start of the performance period) to May 2013 (end of observation 
period). In contrast, the counterfactual (old, 2010) peer group’s TSR was 24% over the same 
period (share price data available for 25 of 29 peers excluding Amec). The firms that were 
added to the peer group performed particularly poorly, showing a negative TSR of -17%, 
while the average TSR of the firms removed from the peer group was 21.9%. Further, the 
median peer in the counterfactual (old, 2010) peer group outperformed 21 of the 25 peers in 
the new peer group, whereas the median peer in the new peer group outperformed 4 of the 25 
old peers only. The annual report explains the vesting rule as follows “…the requirement for 
full vesting is for AMEC to be ranked in the top quartile of the chosen comparator group. No 
awards will vest if AMEC’s performance is below median. If AMEC’s performance is at the 
median, 25 per cent of the award will vest.” The vesting rule means that performance at the 
median of the old peer group would have expected to earn Amec’s CEO 25% of the 
performance share award if the peer group had not been changed. This partial vesting would 
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be valued at 21.9% of the CEO’s salary. The same level of TSR performance after the peer 
group changes were introduced should now trigger full, 100%, vesting. The full vesting 
would be valued at 87.5% of annual salary. These valuations are estimated based on Amec’s 
policy that performance share awards have “… a value at the time of award of up to 175 per 
cent of base salary” and take into account the fact that 50% of the award is TSR-related (and 
the other 50% is EPS-based). We also assume conservatively that the market value of Amec’s 
shares does not change over the course of the performance period. The difference between 
the partial and the full vesting is therefore equivalent to 87.5 – 21.9 = 65.6% of the CEO’s 
annual salary - clearly, a significant increase in the level of expected award - is entirely due to 
the fact that the peer group introduced by the board in 2011 performed significantly weaker 
than the counterfactual peer group that the board used one year earlier and that could have 
been easily “recycled”.  
 
Barclays Plc: In another example, a banking and financial services company Barclays Plc. 
introduced peer group changes in 2010, where four peers-banks were removed and four new 
peers-banks were added to the peer group. The 2010 annual report did not comment on what 
seemed to be significant changes to the composition of 11-strong peer group. Peer 
performance over the 2010-2012 performance period is summarized as follows: 
𝑇𝑆𝑅(𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑2010,𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠) = −0.47, 𝑇𝑆𝑅(𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃2010,𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠) = −0.21, 
𝑇𝑆𝑅(𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑2010,𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠) = 0.03, 𝑇𝑆𝑅(𝑃2010,𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠) = −0.39. This shows that banks 
removed from the peer group in 2010 ended up outperforming the rest of the peer group by 
about 40 percent in the generally tough market, whereas the banks added to the peer group 
performed particularly poorly.  
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Table 1. The list of firms used in the study 
3i Group Carnival LAND SECURITIES SABMiller 
Admiral Group Carphone Whse. GP LEGAL & GENERAL SEVERN TRENT 
Alliance & Leicester Centrica 
LLOYDS BANKING 
GROUP 
SHIRE 
Amec Compass Group 
London Stock 
Ex.Group 
SSE 
Anglo American Diageo Lonmin Sage Group 
Antofagasta Enterprise Inns Man Group Sainsbury (J) 
Associated Brit. 
Foods 
Experian 
Marks & Spencer 
Group 
Schroders 
Astrazeneca First Group 
Morrison(WM)SPMT
KS. 
Smith &Nephew 
Aviva 
Friends Provident 
Group 
National Grid Smiths Group 
BAE Systems G4S Next Standard Chartered 
BG Group GlaxoSmithKline Old Mutual Standard Life 
BHP Billiton HBOS Pearson Taylor Wimpey 
BP HIBU Persimmon Tesco 
BT Group HSBC HDG. Prudential Thomas Cook Group 
Barclays Hammerson RSA Insurance Tui Travel 
British Airways Home Retail Group Reckitt Benckiser Tullow Oil 
British American 
Tobacco 
ICAP Reed Elsevier Unilever (UK) 
British Energy Group ICTL.HTLS.GP. Rentokil Initial 
United Utilities 
Group 
British Land ITV Resolution Vedanta Resources 
British Sky 
Broadcasting Group  
Imperial Tobacco 
GP. 
Rexam Vodafone Group 
Cable & Wireless International Power Rio Tinto WPP 
Cadbury Johnson Matthey Rolls Royce Whitbread 
Cairn Energy KELDA GROUP 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
Wolseley 
Capita KINGFISHER Royal Dutch Shell Xstrata 
Capital 
Shopcts.Group 
Kazakhmys   
 
 
 
 
